The Iran Affair

Washington should get its priorities straight. It has to choose between isolating Tehran and engaging with it. Either way Iraq’s course will be affected.

By John Narayan Parajuli

Necessity is the mother of cooperation. Nothing drives necessity like reality. The reality is that Iraq is in a deep abysmal mess of hydra-headed insurgency and sectarian violence. Once Saddam’s tight fortress, it has turned into a loose boot camp for multinational insurgents. Hell is on the loose in Iraq. America desperately needs some help to fix the problem. And no help would be more instrumental than that of Iran—America’s current enemy no.1.

Iranians have contributed to the mess in a bid to frustrate and wear down America. In addition to Iran, there are a lot of countries who want to see America fail in Iraq. Iran in particular is interested in using this opening to neutralize America’s offensive on Iran’s nuclear program.

Until recently America had avoided soliciting Iranian help. Zalmai Khalizad, American ambassador to Iraq sent a letter to the Iranian regime in January—proposing talks. The Iranians rejected the offer the first time. Khalizad repeated his proposal and his request was accentuated by the Shiite leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who spent years in self-imposed exile in Iran when Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq. Hakim's party other members of the Shiite coalition that dominate Iraq's government are closely allied with Iran. Many Shiites have seen Iran’s positive response as a diplomatic victory.
Back-door channel discussions were reportedly under-way with Iran on resuming direct talks about Iraq that broke off shortly after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.

Tehran’s primary interest is finding a way to escape the American heat on the nuclear issue while exploring the possibility of using talks on Iraq as a channel to broader framework of diplomatic negotiations with Washington.

Iran’s acceptance was announced by Ali Larijani, Iran's chief negotiator on its nuclear program, who is believed to be close to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. Larijani made remarks that reflect Tehran’s appetite to reach an accommodation with Washington on nuclear and other issues.


Briefing journalists in March, Khalizad said "Iraqis will decide their own future, but they have concerns about Iranian policy regarding Iraq. The United States is concerned about unhelpful Iranian activities in Iraq. These concerns are well known, and we have talked about them." It is still not certain how this prospect of cooperation is going to play out. The Iranians are able and willing to help. But the officials in the Bush administration are not fully invested about the prospect of negotiating, let alone taking Iran’s help on that matter. They rightly fear that Iran will use Iraq as a trump card in the nuclear issue—forcing Washington to soft-pedal its approach on Iran.

Washington has to get its priorities straight. It needs to be clear as to what is important: Isolating the Iranian regime, or ensuring some semblance of victory in Iraq—by bringing Iran into the fold.

The Bush administration is divided between hardliners and moderates. Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are against the idea of involving Iran in Iraq. But Condoleezza Rice and Khalizad, at least for now, seem to have convinced President Bush that it’s worth trying.

In recent days President Bush has presented himself as a pragmatist. He has increasingly adopted a tone of reconciliation rather than a confrontation. The positive Change in his tone may be indicative of moderation in his policies too.

The Bush administration’s has definitely displayed penchant for cooperation with Iran over the crisis in Iraq. But the prospect of a package talk with Iran—as opposed to an isolated talk on Iraq—is making the administration officials non-committal.

The fear among hardliners in Washington is that if the Iranians become more deeply involved in the internal negotiation in Iraq, the efficacy of their role will make it more difficult for the United States to resist the pressures to widen the range of negotiations to include the all the issues in the region.

That fear is somewhat misplaced. If loosing diplomatic weight is the concern, engaging Tehran will provide more room for diplomatic leverage. If the United States fears that engaging with Tehran would undermine its effort to weaken the current regime, it may be right. But if our Iraqi experience is anything, the path of coercive regime change is perilous and should not be attempted again. There is so much room for effecting a change, encouraging democratic reform through a slow but meaningful engagement with Iran. Washington needs to avoid overplaying its cards and fears—especially in the case of Tehran—as it might very well become counterproductive.