Silencing Dissent

Silencing Dissent
It is increasingly becoming difficult to subscribe to the theory that all is fine within the Maoists party. How party bosses handle dissent is everyone’s concern.

By John Narayan Parajuli

Prachanda utilizes his craftsmanship for character assassination dexterously to wear and tear down his opponent. He relied on his expertise again in early March, while justifying the expulsion of the two Senior Maoists leaders Rabindra Shrestha and Anukul, after the duo went public with their criticism of party chieftain Prachanda and ideologue Baburam Bhattarai. It may be an overstatement to say that this is a picture of a movement in crisis, but it certainly is an indication of structural weariness after 10 long years.
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This is not the first instance that Prachanda has expelled his party men, but it certainly is first such instance that was made public: Baburam Bhattarai and his supporters have already faced the ire of Prachanda twice now. The Maoists movement may have not split so far, but the odds are higher now than ever.
These developments could possibly be the tip of the iceberg of a growing dissent within the party vis-à-vis Prachanda’s leadership style. It may also be a sign of desperation compounded by a feeling (among other senior and junior party leaders) that the Maoists movement has deviated from its original path. A lack of semblance of Maoists victory even after 10 years of rebellion, let alone a total victory, may have dampened the morale among the rank and file. It’s difficult to come up with the exact account of the internal state of Maoists movement. All these analysis are speculative at best.
The only information that we have for sure is that Prachanda has had the last word. Any dissent in Politburo has been effectively marginalized by Prachanda and his men—using weaponry from bureaucratic inventory: explusion, transfer or demotion.
It’s not unusual for a party to fall prey to dynastic or personality-based politics. Our mainstream party Nepali Congress might even lag behind the Maoists in the scale of intra-party democracy. But that’s beside the point I am trying to make here.
In the Maoists movement, an intra-party democracy will have different dynamic and so will the lack of it can trigger another set of dynamics. It’s built-in nature of any radical movement to rely on one or more charismatic leaders to further the movement—as the movement itself is the product of the intellectual discourse of few. Yet with the passage of time such reliance falls and should fall on a collective body of men within the movement, than just one or handful of individual. It particularly has dangerous ramification for the movement and the nation as a whole.
Whether one likes it or not, the fallout of any untoward incident within the Maoists party will have lasting repercussion on the nation. There has long been speculation about the split in the Maoists. So far Prachanda has managed to pull the party together by hook or by crook, but the question is how long?
Dissent in itself is not injurious to an organization. If dealt properly, it can in fact add value to the quality of the discourse and demeanor within an organization. But if handled with hubris or panic, its likely stray not just the dissenters, but the organization itself beyond the permitted range of digression.
The signs of mishandled dissent, the despotic myopia of the establishment within the Maoists movement come at a crucial juncture. The efforts of the mainstreamers to bring the Maoists within their fold seem to be yielding results slowly but surely.
Rabindra Shrestha and Ankul may appear small fry in comparison to Prachanda and Baburam from the outset, however that doesn’t lessen the anxiety of unpleasant fallout.
It’s highly unlikely that these two dissenting duo were acting alone. Analysts are right to speculate that there must be some kind of backing, or at least an assurance from the military wing of the Maoists. Without a tacit agreement with other Maoists leaders the duo would certainly have had resisted going public. Expulsion is always a good reason to form a splinter group. Or at least that has been the norm, if the history of Nepali communist movement is anything to go by.
Amid all these, the Maoists have intensified their attacks against military and police posts throughout the country in what appears to be synchronized attacks against low-key targets. If one were to carefully observe these new patterns of Maoists military assault, it’s not difficult speculate the objective. The gain from these low-key targets is nothing more than symbolic. It may very well be an effort to divert attention from their structural problems within their organization. It could also be a “make-believe” effort on their part that their strategy is going well according to its time table—meaning that the phase for surrounding and capturing the cities has arrived. Capturing the cities has so far proved to be a drunken delusion with few subscribers but the Maoists themselves.
It is also increasingly difficult to subscribe to the theory that all is fine within the Maoists party. How party bosses handle dissent is everyone’s concern. It’s a window into the internal workings of the insurgency—that has profoundly affected the Nepali state. It is a commentary on the character of the party and its leaders—that relies so much on its grandstanding vis-à-vis its “character.”