Transitional Tantrums

The palace monopoly on state may be over, but the danger in the ensuing anarchy raises doubt if this is more than just a transitional flux. The specter of no one being in charge is no less terrifying.

By John Narayan Parajuli

As if the revolution of April has opened a Pandora’s Box, a quick glimpse over Nepali horizon will detect more problems than it did before April 24. There are more daily protests. More and more people seem frustrated, more vigilantes lurking to set things right in their own way. The overall violence has ebbed since the monarch’s wings were clipped, but there is no excuse for the continuing cycle of needless deaths. The Maoists cadres continue to run amok—despite repeated assurances from their leaders. How much of this is a transitional flux and how much a battle to undercut each other?
It’s not uncomplicated to make sense of the daily occurrences in Nepal. An upbeat Nepali society following the revolution suddenly seems to be overcast by clouds of doubts and uncertainty. After assuming an astronomical speed, suddenly the parties involved in the negotiations have decided to slow down by the same measure. It’s easy to be overwhelmed by the news. We don’t’ have to give up just yet. Transition periods are never smooth and we shouldn’t expect one. I would still give the Seven Party Alliance the benefit of doubt. If Prachanda is man of his words, his first press conference should be assuring us as well.
It is perhaps effortless to sit at the commentariat and criticize SPA for all its shortcomings; we shouldn’t however forget that it had a colossal task cut out. SPA has been hard at work. Not matter, how its actions are viewed, it had the will to institutionalize the gains of the revolution. Many have questioned the relevance of SPA’s parliamentary marathon. But one should not forget that with the elimination of the Palace from the equation, the resultant void was not less perilous. There would have been a power struggle if it was left unattended. Worst, certain elements within the palace, not the king himself, could very well have tried to bounce back. The Thai coup admonishes us to chart the course carefully. SPA had to tread a difficult course in dealing with the Army; so far it has done an excellent job of bringing it under a civilian control, although its loyalty remains to be tested.
SPA is under constant watch and it knows that it can’t deviate, however there is another party to the conflict that needs to be, if not more, equally brought under active scrutiny. Nepali civil society has been relatively soft towards the rebels. Perhaps that’s the nature of the civil society and press to be sympathetic towards the underdogs. But the Maoists are no longer the underlings. They have transformed into major league players. Things have changed, so should the attitude.
One wonders when the Maoists would give up chest-thumping: The April Revolution was in no way an endorsement of the Maoists agenda—the Maoists should stop acting like it was. They contributed in the success of the April Revolution. And we are all glad they did.
Prachanda summed up his party’s intention in his first press conference. But they haven’t been quite translated into action; his cadres continue to act against his party’s stance, while on the contrary Maoists leaders continue to justify their misdemeanors. Prachanda and his men continue to brow-beat their rivals cum partners in the peace process into total submission. There is a simmering anger among a sizeable chunk of the population that the Maoists agenda is thoroughly being implemented. That’s a legitimate anger simply because not everyone is a Maoist or buys the Maoists agenda, for that matter. Unless the Maoists come clean, the peace process isn’t going forward. Just claiming an autonomous place in the fraternity of equals isn’t going to do them any good, unless they learn to treat others as equals too. Despite encouraging sings, they haven’t quite done that yet. The weapon in their possession is problematic and gives them unfair advantage. Until recently, it was my belief that too much pressure too soon on the Maoists could break them. But now I am convinced that there is no other way but to force them. This is not to imply that the Maoists give up weapons just like that: Disarm in a mutually acceptable fashion without further delay.
The longer the delay, the bitter it will get, and the harder it will become to avoid a split in their movement. It’s very likely that there are some deeply entrenched opportunists in the insurgency movement for whom peace could soon become nasty. A delay would also mean shift in public mood. Public mood is volatile, the possibility of it going soft on monarchy can not be ruled out. If the recent NDI-AC Nielson poll is any indication, public volte-face on republic is imminent lest the Maoists ebb their offensive. All this would mean they would lose their bargaining chip over time. Perhaps they can’t see this. Media coverage and plethora of invitations and honors can be delusional.
Flattering as these receptions are, they can be dream shattering too. And all these receptions come with strings attached: Expectations. And Maoists haven’t quite lived up to my expectations, and many many more others like me. Now if that feels like more than they signed up for. They should expect more. After all, who said conversion into the church of mainstream of politics was easy?