The Triangular Conflict in Nepal

By John Narayan Parajuli

On the rhetorical level, at least, all the three warring parties in Nepal, the Maoists, the monarchy, and the mainstream political parties are hardening their stance about how Nepal should be governed. But behind the veneer of their radical talk, which they use as a bargaining tactic, their positions are mellowing as the reality dawns that in this triangular conflict, none could win. The Maoists, a radical communist group, has been fighting since 1996 to establish a republican communist state in Nepal by overthrowing the incumbent government. The situation further got compounded when the King dismissed the democratically elected government in 2002 and appointed a series of pro-palace candidates as prime ministers. Early this year he took direct control of the government, declaring a state of emergency and arresting hundreds of political leaders, human rights activists, journalists and students. Since then the conflict has effectively become three-pronged.
The Maoists insurgency has become nine years old leaving behind deep scars of trauma and destruction as its only visible legacy while the mainstream parties have been agitating for three years now. But the status quo has not changed. At the eye of these storms is the monarchy. The former wishes to do away with it, the later desires to clip the wing of the monarchy—rendering it to a mere Westminster style rubberstamp.
As the triangular fight is protracting, the Maoists, the government and the parties are increasingly growing battle-weary and are evidently inclined to give peace a chance. Though the time is ripe for initiating a peace process, it has not been that easy, after all. Exploring the common ground would provide all the belligerent forces a face-saving way out and most importantly Nepal an opportunity for a safe-landing. In this paper I will present a review of all the three elements that would contribute in bringing all warring sides to the table. Rekindling mutual trust, appointing third party mediator and a declaration of mutual ceasefire are some of the crucial steps that would set the tone for a lasting peace process.
Despite the fact that both the Army and the Maoists seem willing to give peace a chance, and the unarmed mainstream parties more than eager to take a peaceful recourse, no visible peace overtures has been seen from the either side. Neither side has extended the olive branch, why? Lack of mutual trust nips any prospect of peace in its bud.
Confidence Building Measure
The Maoists in particular are under intense pressure to initiate some kind of peace talks that would provide them a graceful exit. In his recent article, journalist Akhilesh Upadhyay, former editor of Nation Weekly news magazine, says of Gunaraj Luitel, news editor of Kantipur, Nepal’s top daily news paper, on the Maoists’ desperation. “[He] believes that they [Maoists] see alignment with the parties as the best possible option.” (p1). Though the Maoists are under pressure, it’s unlikely they would come from the cold without any symbolic concession from the government. In the absence of a tell-tale sign of any concession from the government, the Maoists leadership is forced to put a tough posture. John Narayan Parajuli, another Nepali journalist believes that “… the Maoists leadership cannot afford to be seen to cave in to government pressure: Their cadres would simply not accept it.” (p.25). He thinks that “a symbolic concession from the state could bring the Maoists to the table.” (p.26).Not just the Maoists even the government wants some concession. And so do the parties that negotiated with the Maoists
Maoists have an image problem. The general belief in the government circle is that the Maoists backed out from the last peace talk and that they cannot be trusted. It’s the once bitten twice shy effect. Lack of trust, which is reciprocal, has made all three sides non-committal to the prospect of peace. For instance the government has put a price tag on the heads of Maoists leaders. Withdrawal of that decree would go a long way in allaying the Maoists’ fear. Another big stumbling bloc is the ambiguity about the monarch’s position and his bottom line on the whole peace process. All the three sides have to do their fair share of confidence building bidding. The Maoists in turn have to gear down their attacks on the government officials as well as toning down their propaganda machinery. They have to assure the public and the other two sides that when they come to the table, they are willing to compromise in equal length as the two other sides. During the past two failed round of negotiations the Maoists have been accused of being too rigid on the table. There is no such thing as non-negotiable during negotiation. The spirit of negotiation holds that the outcome would be a win-win situation for all parties involved in the process. These efforts to rekindle mutual trust will fade away if it is not immediately followed up with establishment of informal contacts leading to the discussion on a third party mediator and eventual agreement on appointing one.
Appointing a Third-party Mediator
The issue of appointing a third party mediator has been a thorny issue. The Maoists have time and again said that they prefer United Nations; the government however has delivered a cold shoulder to the Maoists call. A fear is at play. The government fears that the Maoists will get an unnecessary recognition which will elevate their bargaining status. Though the analysts share some of the government’s concern, they insist that in the long run an international mediation will be a win-win situation for both the parties. An Indian analyst who keeps tab on the Nepal thinks that it may not be entirely wrong to invite international mediation. He argues that a larger portion of the Nepalese public and leaders of political organizations are in favor of international meditation to end the political deadlock. He insists that the government could explain its compulsions and then follow an progressive course of action while initiating some confidence-building measures acceptable to itself and the Maoists which he believes will a create conducive environment to resume peace talks.(Soren.)
The government, however, argues that a U.N. meditation is no panacea and that protocols and all the bureaucratic hassles that come with U.N. could further protract the crisis without a solution. But he defends the idea of having an international mediator by saying that “[although] there is still heavy resistance to international intervention in terms of an international facilitator or mediator, the international community can certainly assist Nepalese civil society with capacity building, as well as [to] build the capacity of the negotiation team members regarding the techniques of dialogue and use of a common negotiation language.”(Soren) Though the government prefers a home-grown solution to an international mediation like U.N., there is a glimmer of hope amid the distrust and denials. In the past local independent mediators have been at the work. But the works of these mediators were never documented. Agreeing on a third party mediator is likely to remain as a bone of contention. Nevertheless, if the peace process is to move forward, all the three negotiating teams have to come up with a concrete agreement as to who would monitor, facilitate and guide the whole peace process. Once this is done, a mutual declaration of ceasefire must follow. Ceasefire will both be a test of their rekindled trust and their commitment for peace in each other and also the fact that it will give the much needed respite to the people, not to mention the fighting force of both warring parties, and the unarmed mainstream parties.
A Mutual Declaration of Ceasefire
Two previous rounds of ceasefire have failed to produce a lasting peace. Some argue that peace talks must take place without a public announcement of ceasefire. They say that peace talks should take place far from the glare of media or the public. On the contrary, peace talk with public knowledge would make parties more responsible. Moreover, cessation of mutual hostilities at the public level is a must to maintain the conducive environment for a lasting peace. An escalation in fighting during or even right before the negotiations commence will only put more pressure on the Maoists leadership to fight to the finish. To keeps the guns silent is one such crucial yet very volatile part of any conflict. Getting a truce may not be tough, but keeping it is a fragile task. As an editorial in Nepali Times, a weekly news magazine, put it succinctly, a ceasefire “in any conflict is the most delicate time, where words have to be weighed before being uttered, actions thought through for their impact. A truce is a tight-rope act.” (Give Peace a Chance.)
If an armistice is a just a tight-rope act over a little creek, an actual peace settlement would mean walking on a tight-rope across the Niagara fall. That, however, does not imply that it is an impossible task. Achieving peace in Nepal is an uphill battle, but that can be overcome by rekindling mutual trust, agreeing on a third-party mediator and ceasing mutual hostilities by keeping the guns silent. But living through this process to peace would require more than just rhetoric.





Citations
Budhathoki.S. (2005). The king’s communist conundrum. Asian Affairs Journal. Retrieved July 19, 2005 from http://www.asianaffairs.com/oct2004/nepal.htm
Give peace a chance. (March 14, 2003). Nepali Times. Retrieved July 15, 2005 from http://www.nepalnews.com/ntimes/issue136/editorial.htm
Lal, C.K. (July.8, 2005). Our 3Ms. Nepali Times. Retrieved July 21 from http://nepalitimes.com/issue255/stateofthestate.htm
Parajuli, J.N. (Dec.10, 2004). End game? Nation Weekly, 34 (1), 20-25
Soren.P. (2005). Noises of peace in Nepal. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved July 19, 2005 from http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A157.htm
Upadhyay, A. (2005). Maoists, parties take tentative steps closer.
Retrieved July 17, 2005 from http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29139