From 2004

End Game?

The Maoists will take a call for elections as a fight to the finish because the process holds the key to the government’s continued existence. The PM’s men still hope that talks can be started soon, but their optimism is tempered with the recognition that elections may be unavoidable.

By John Narayan Parajuli

If Prime Minster Sher Bahadur Deuba previous experience and remarkable political comeback made him confident that he could restore peace and organize polls, he must be wondering now. While there is still some time left for him to fulfill his mandate from the monarch, time is growing shorter and the pressure on him is increasing daily. Late last month the prime minister responded by issuing an ultimatum to the Maoists to come to the negotiating table by January 13, or the government would call elections.

What the government really wants is measurable progress towards peace, but it hasn’t been able to convince the Maoists to come for talks. In the face of this failure, pressure is building within the coalition to opt for reinstatement of the Pratinidhi Shabha, the lower house of Parliament dissolved by Deuba two-and-a-half years ago. Deuba has already said no to the plan, and it looks like he will stick to his guns. Unless the Supreme Court reverses its 2002 ruling upholding the dissolution or the Maoists suddenly accept the PM’s ultimatum—both unlikely events—then there will be an election, and it will be a political endgame.

“We are hopeful that peace can be achieved,” says Minendra Rijal, Deuba’s aide and spokesman of NC-D, the prime minister’s party. Despite his refusal to speculate on what might happen after January 13, it is clear that the government will be left with few options. NC-D officials give the impression that the government will call the election, but they prefer to talk about peace talks instead.

By refusing to speculate on the future, sources close to the prime minister signal that they want to avoid forcing the Maoists’ hand or precipitating Parliament’s reinstatement. Insiders say the ultimatum may not be a statement of actual intent, at least not yet, to hold an election. Nonetheless, it is a last ditch attempt to turn up the heat on the Maoists, who, without categorically refusing to talk, have, at best, sent ambiguous messages about their intention. The Maoists have played mainstream parties against each other: At times they have pretended to side with parties in the street; at others they have attacked cadres of those same parties. The purpose is to keep the parties off-balance and divided, and the strategy has worked. The insurgents have succeeded in significantly undermining both the government and the opposition parties, and in doing that they have become the dominant political force in the country today. The government has been forced almost to a standstill by its internal contradictions and the Maoists’ psychological warfare.

The government knows it cannot afford to be seen as ineffectual. Analysts say by talking about the election the government is keeping hopes for its survival alive. The peace or polls refrain stems directly from the twin mandate from the King. The government wants to be seen to be at least trying to live up to at least one of those goals. But peace and polls are so intertwined that meaningful elections without peace will be a huge gamble.

No one could feel more ambivalent about elections than the prime minister himself: The issue has deeply damaged his political reputation and could do so again. His renown for being a finisher in politics and his ability to appease irate opposition politicians has been damaged by his previous flip-flops on the issue. But the situation has reached do-or-die proportions for Deuba; he has to champion elections if he is to ensure his government’s continuing existence. “The election glitz is a political compulsion for the present government,” says Professor Bharat Bahadur Karki of Nepal Law Campus, who keeps a close tab on political affairs. And the prospect for successful, credible elections will rest on the Army’s ability to provide a measure of security.

The Royal Nepal Army, with its 80, 000 troops, says it is ready provide security for the polls if the government calls on them. But it also warns that no one should expect an election under that circumstance to be normal. Far from it: “There are going to be explosions,” says Brigadier General Deepak Gurung, Army’s spokesman, “but that shouldn’t deter us.” One can expect the situation to be a lot like Kashmir, he says.

It’s not clear that the Army can improve security to even Kashmir-like conditions, but a senior minister of Deuba’s party remains upbeat. He cites the Afghan example, and other government officials are also enthused by the remarks of election observers who served there. If elections can be held in war-torn Afghanistan, they can be held here too, the minister quotes an observer as having said to him. Deuba’s coterie also seems to be reassured by the assumption that an election, once announced, will build its own momentum.

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Prakash Sharan Mahat, during a dinner meeting with journalists(or “a journalist”?) late last month, conceded that the government hasn’t made a final decision about polls and that it is still ambivalent. “Once we decide to hold elections,” says Minister Mahat, “[the decision] will automatically build momentum and help create consensus.”

He believes that once the election is announced, even parties like the Nepali Congress will decide they have to participate. NC-D ministers in the government also seem to have taken heart from the Dailekh uprising against the Maoists. More such spontaneous rejections of the Maoists, says the minister, will make the task of the security forces easier. Observers say that Maoists excesses have reached their saturation point. “Unless people resist,” says Chitra Bahadur KC, the coordinator of Janmorcha’s resistance committee against the Maoists in the western region, “there will be no escape from the Maoists’ atrocities.” Janmorcha and the Maoists are at war with each other. We are not giving our heads to them without a fight, says KC.

The woman-led uprising still spreading in Dailekh stunned the Maoists. The government is hoping for more of the same, and even for a countrywide reaction against the rebels. The Dailekh incident is a clear signal that people’s tolerance is waning quickly after they have been cowed by Maoist violence for many years. And the Maoists, perhaps for the first time, have seen directly the extent of ordinary Nepalis’ alienation from them. Maoist leader Diwakar’s hastily faxed statement said that his party would probe the Dailekh incident and punish the guilty is a clear indication of the effectiveness of the public uprising. But it is also sign that the Maoist leadership is losing control of its radical and zealot cadres. The testimony of people who have been in Maoist detention supports the reports of factional disputes inside the Maoist movement. The psychological toll on Maoist cadres must be enormous after 9 years of war. Even three years of deployment have been difficult for the Army.

“How can you expect security forces to perform better when they haven’t had a break for the last three years?” asks an Army officer. There is battle fatigue among the security forces, although Army officials avoid using the term. The security personnel are also deeply distressed by Maoist intimidation of their families. Army officials point to the gravity of situation when they say that most soldiers haven’t been able to visit their homes and families even during festivals because they are unsafe there. Despite such revealing insight, officials are quick to add that they are fighting a hydra-headed enemy, and that it will take time to win. “Insurgency cannot be resolved immediately,” says Army spokesman Gurung. “No levelheaded Army officer would say it is easy.” Such comments show increasing realism in the security forces’ appraisal of the situation.

RNA officials have never called for a military-only solution, and they are now quick to point out that for the insurgency to be completely defeated, its socio-economic underpinnings have to be addressed quickly and comprehensively. But that hasn’t happened in the last nine years; there’s no reason to be surprised that it hasn’t happened in recent months either.

After more than six months in office, the Deuba government hasn’t accomplished much. The Maoists are becoming increasingly ruthless. Reports about occasional atrocities by some members of the armed forces have become more shocking. Any middle ground that once existed is disappearing. “The Army is making certain mistakes,” says Gurung, “but we are correcting them.” He admits that the security personnel haven’t been able to give the impression to the people that they are fighting for them. The Army says it is making progress against the Maoists, but none of it has been translated into progress towards peace: That’s all that matters to the public.

If peace were like fruit growing in the garden, the Deuba government would have wasted no time in plucking it and sharing with the nation, without having to talk about elections or the reinstatement of Parliament. Unfortunately, it is not. Deuba knows that he can’t just wish away the problems and that he has squandered much of the goodwill and high expectation that the people entrusted to him when he came to office in June. The government has appeared to be inconsistent, incoherent and, worst of all, to be drifting steadily to the right.

Critics say that the government’s credibility has also been undermined by its inability to get a truce and by the hubris (arrogance?) evident in its handling of the peace process. The only thing this government has been consistent in, they say, is its refusal to make the first move or to learn from the situation. Pundits say the other big mistake this administration made was in not making clear its own agenda and bottom line for negotiations. They say the government drew the wrong lessons from the past. By steadfastly refusing even to discuss the Maoists’ key agenda items, the government has hardened the Maoists’ position.

Analysts say that the Maoist leadership cannot afford to be seen to cave in to government pressure: Their cadres would simply not accept it. They say that a symbolic concession from the state could bring the Maoists to the table. But the government has refused to make any concession, based on Deuba’s reading that despite the Maoists’ apocalyptic rhetoric they have no choice but to talk. The refusal has also been influenced by military analysis that concessions would provide the rebels space to regroup and rearm themselves, as, both the Army and the PM say, they did during previous rounds of talks. The government continues to believe that the Maoists will come in from the cold, but it realizes it cannot wait indefinitely. The ultimatum is a last-gasp attempt to bring the Maoists to the table. The careful language Deuba uses and the government’s deliberate refusal to commit to a date for an election are its best effort to balance carrot and stick.

If Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was careless in dissolving the Pratinidhi Shabha in 2002, he certainly is being careful now to avoid reinstatement. If he was hasty about postponing the election last time, he is slowly moving in that direction now. He clearly wants to escape both options and wait for peace talks to take place, but he can’t. Elections have become crucial to his government’s continuing existence and to retaining his personal and political prestige. But part of government’s problem also stems from belief among some factions within the Maoists that they can win by being patient and simply not losing.

“The Maoists feel that they are close to wielding state power,” says Professor Karki. This may be the reason why they have avoided talks. No one knows for sure how long the Maoists will abstain from a dialogue, as their messages have been ambiguous. Hope is still a common refrain in government circles. “We are hopeful that they will come to the table,” says Deuba’s aide Rijal. But such hope is tempered with the realization that without elections, “Mr. Deuba cannot remain as prime minister for an indefinite period.” Deuba’s reputation and much, much more is on the line.